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LIMITING DIRECTORS' DUTY OF 
CARE LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DELA WARE'S CHARTER 
AMENDMENT APPROACH 
Corporate directors are primarily responsible for monitoring 
the performance and decisionmaking of management.1 To pro-
mote this role, two nonmarket2 methods have been developed to 
ensure that directors· take an active interest in reviewing man-
agement recommendations. The first method is to expose direc-
tors to potential duty of care liability. Although the legal defini-
tion of a director's duty of care is subject to different· state 
interpretations, it essentially requires that directors make deci-
sions in an informed manner and with reasonable care. 3 The sec-
1. The monitoring model of the role of the board of directors recognizes that time 
and information constraints prevent directors from determining business policy on their 
own. The role of the board is therefore limited to a supervisory function; the board holds 
management accountable for adequate results, while management retains responsibility 
for determining what business policies to pursue. Effective monitoring requires that di-
rectors remain independent of the chief executive and sufficiently informed of the bases 
of management decisions. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 164-66 (1976). 
Recent cases have been particularly concerned with the failure of directors to perform 
their monitoring role adequately. See infra note 22 (discussing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 
264 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
2. For a discussion of market mechanisms that encourage director diligence in super-
vising management, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
3. Duty of care liability was originally based on the common law requirement that 
directors make such reasonable inquiry as circumstances required. In Barnes v. Andrews, 
298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), Judge Learned Hand described the monitoring role of a 
corporate director and his common law fiduciary duty of care as follows: 
[A director's] liability must therefore depend on his failure in general to keep 
advised of the conduct of the corporate affairs. The measure of a director's du-
ties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting themselves with vague dec-
larations, such as that a director must give reasonable attention to the corporate 
business. While directors are collectively the managers of the company, they are 
not expected to interfere individually in the actual conduct of its affairs. To do 
so would disturb the authority of the officers and destroy their individual re-
sponsibility, without which no proper discipline is possible. To them must be left 
the initiative and the immediate direction of the business; the directors can act 
individually only by counsel and advice to them. Yet they have an individual 
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ond, and more recently developed,' method is to encourage the 
seating of outside independent persons on corporate boards. 
Outside directors are believed to be more likely to question and 
challenge management decisions than inside directors who are 
themselves corporate officers.11 
Directors' reluctance to expose themselves to the enormous 
potential costs and liability that can arise from duty of care liti-
gation6 forces corporations to provide some sort of protection 
against this vulnerability. Until recently, most corporations in-
demnified their directors against duty of care derivative suits by 
purchasing directors and officers liability insurance (D & 0 in-
surance).' As a result of recent increases in the volume of share-
duty to keep themselves informed in some detail, and it is this duty which the 
defendant in my judgment failed adequately to perform. 
Recently, the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project has attempted 
to codify a model definition of the duty of care. Section 4.01 provides: 
A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in 
good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would rea-
sonably be expected to exercise in a like position under similar circumstances. 
AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN· 
DATIONS § 4.0l(a), at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 4). 
States differ in their interpretation of duty of care standards. See Tentative Draft No. 
4, 29-43 (reporter's note to § 4.0l(a)) for a survey of duty of care standards under state 
laws. In Delaware, a director's duty of care liability must be "predicated upon concepts 
of gross negligence." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
4. See The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56 [hereinafter Busi-
NESS WEEK) ("It was not until the 1960s that, under pressure from Washington and Wall 
Street, companies began to emphasize the election of outsiders."). 
5. A great deal has been written on the role of the outside director. Two seminal 
works are M. EISENBERG, supra note 1 and M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 
(1971). See M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 172 ("Since the board's principal function is 
to monitor management's performance, and since a director who is not independent can 
scarcely be trusted to perform that function, board membership for such persons seems 
counterproductive."). 
6. Damages for duty of care violations are based on the tort principle that a negligent 
party should be liable for all the foreseeable consequences resulting from his negligence. 
This can lead to potentially staggering liability in the context of a large modern corpora-
tion. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). After the Delaware Su-
preme Court found the directors liable for breaching their duty of care, the parties 
agreed to settle for $23.5 million. The indemnification insurance policy covered only $10 
million of the settlement, but, fortunately for the directors, the acquiring Pritzker group 
paid the difference. · 
7. D & 0 insurance first appeared in the 1960's and has been a subject of controversy 
ever since. For a discussion of the coverage of D & 0 policies and the debate over the 
merits of indemnifying directors against duty of care liability, see J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE (1981): 
The fundamental policy considerations are, of course, on the one hand, fairness 
to the individual and the need to induce competent people to serve, or at least 
not to discourage them from serving, as corporate directors and officers, bal-
anced against, on the other hand, the undesirability of immunizing corporate 
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holder derivative actions,8 and the size of court awards,9 how-
ever, D & 0 insurance premiums have skyrocketed.10 Many 
companies can no longer find, or afford, insurance for their di-
rectors.11 Without D & 0 insurance, corporations are finding jt 
difficult to attract and retain qualified outside directors.12 A 
number of corporations have suffered mass resignations of 
outside directors when it was discovered that they could not re-
new their liability insurance. 13 
The inability of corporations to, indemnify their directors has 
led to an alarming trend. For the first time since the 1960's, the 
management, or permitting it to immunize itself, from the consequences of its 
negligence or misconduct. 
Id. 11 1.02. 
8. A 1986 study by the Wyatt Company compared the amount of litigation against 
directors in 1974 with that in 1984. The survey found that the number of companies 
reporting one or more claims against directors and officers rose 162 % , an increase from 
7.1 % to 18.6~;,. Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at Dl, 
cols. 2, 3. 
9. Id. The Wyatt Study also found that the percentage of claims with payment over 
$1 million increased 73%, from 4.8% to 8.3%, and the average defense cost per claim 
increased 154%, from $181,500 to $461,000. 
10. A 1986 study by Korn/Ferry International, a management search firm, found that 
D & 0 insurance premiums on the average rose 362% from 1984 to 1985. At the same 
time, total dollar coverage decreased on the average from $59,064,000 to $34,131,000. 
KORN/FERRY INT'L, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 20 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY]. See infra note 12 for other findings of the study. 
11. The New York Times noted: 
Most companies are experiencing a double blow: The amount of coverage they 
can get has been cut drastically, from as much as $50 million to $150 million last 
year to $10 million to $35 million, while the premiums they must pay for even 
that reduced coverage have increased as much as tenfold. And in certain indus-
tries-such as steel, petroleum and electronics-there may be a problem simply 
finding an insurer. 
Lewin, supra note 8, at Dl, col. 3. 
12. A 1985 study by Korn/Ferry International surveyed 592 corporations from a 
broad range of American businesses. They found: 
1. Sixty percent of the companies polled said that recent court decisions affect-
ing overall responsibilities of corporate boards are creating potentially dangerous 
precedents, inhibiting a company's ability to attract new directors. Thirty-four 
percent said they thought recent court decisions would hurt them in retaining 
existing directors. 
2. Nearly 62% of the chief executive officers polled said they will reduce the 
number of directorships they accept because of increased liability. 
3. Fifty-two percent of the companies polled reported that the sharp rise in di-
rectors' and officers' liability insurance will make it more difficult to recruit high 
level outside directors. The companies surveyed said they are paying, on average, 
362% more for D & 0 coverage this year than last year, and some companies 
cannot get D & 0 insurance at any price. 
4. One out of five qualified candidates turned down an invitation to serve as a 
director. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY, supra note 10, at 1. 
13. BusINESS WEEK, supra note 4, at 56 (citing 10 instances since 1984 where the loss 
of liability insurance has led to mass resignations of outside directors). 
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makeup of boards is shifting to company insiders. 14 The percent-
age of outside directors on the boards of the largest 1000 indus-
trial companies dropped to 57.5% in 1986 from 63.2% in 1985.111 
The trend is likely to continue if insurance costs do not de-
crease.16 This shift is particularly troublesome because it comes 
at a time when courts are requiring directors to take a more ac-
tive role in scrutinizing the behavior of management in the face 
of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and other vital corporate 
concerns which often pit management's interests against the in-
terests of the shareholders. 17 
A less obvious, but equally harmful, by-product of the insur-
ance crunch is its chilling effect on entrepreneurial activity. Ex-
cessive duty of care liability can deter the willingness of direc-
tors to engage in risk-taking activity.18 Excessive potential 
liability also can affect the quality of a director's decision. Al-
14. Id. at 57. If corporate boards are dominated by insiders, then their ability to 
monitor management's actions will be greatly impaired. See also supra note 5 and ac-
companying text. 
15. Id. at 57. Heidrick & Struggles, an executive search firm, provided statistics based 
on their annual survey of major corporations. This is the first marked decline since 1966, 
when the firm initially began tracking these numbers. 
16. Id. at 56 (quoting a director of an executive search firm who predicted "[a] trend 
toward smaller boards, fewer meetings, and more inside directors"). This could effec-
tively lead to a return to the traditional style of directing where the board acted as a 
rubber stamp for management. 
17. Several recent cases have emphasized the importance of impartial behavior by 
outside directors when faced with a hostile bid. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986): 
Once it becomes apparent that a takeover target will be acquired by new owners, 
whether by an alleged "raider" or by a team consisting of management and a 
"white knight," it becomes the duty of the target's directors to see that the 
shareholders obtain the best price possible for their stock. "The directors' role 
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." 
Id. at 886-87 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986)). 
18. Professor Conard first advanced this argument: 
Another probable avoidance response to the threat of liability claims is to ex-
pend great effort on establishing a record of diligence. Directors may refuse to 
make decisions unless they are supplied with opinions of accountants certifying 
the accuracy of financial statements, appraisers' estimates of the value of 
properties, forecasts by management consultants of profit prospects, engineers' 
analyses of production costs, and lawyers' opinions about the legality of a course 
of conduct. Directors may insist, as a condition of affirmative action, that the 
documents take strong positive views of a proposed course, so as to prove on any 
later audit that the directors used "due diligence." Such an attitude would force 
managers to find and use consultants who tend more toward optimism than to-
ward candor and illumination. In this way, the fear of liability may tend to de-
grade, rather than to elevate, the decisional processes of directors. 
Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability For Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 
895, 903-04 (citations omitted). 
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though some directors may reach more sound decisions than 
they otherwise might if not threatened with liability, others may 
be so concerned with maintaining a documented record of dili-
gence in order to ensure protection under the business judgment 
rule that, consequently, their attention is diverted away from 
solving the company's problems.19 
These concerns over excessive director liability were height-
ened in early 1985 when the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
Smith v. Van Gorkom (the Trans Union case).20 Before Trans 
Union, courts rarely found individual directors liable for breach-
ing their duty of care in the absence of some form of self-deal-
ing.21 In Trans Union the court reversed this trend by holding a 
board of directors liable for breaching its duty of care despite 
the lack of any evidence indicating bad faith or self-dealing. The 
directors' liability was predicated on their failure to inform 
themselves and deliberate sufficiently before approving a take-
over offer.22 
Recent business articles support this concern. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 8, at Dl, col. 
4 (citing New York lawyer Martin Lipton's observation of "a real risk of overcaution" 
caused by excessive liability exposure). But see Frankel, Corporate Directors's Duty of 
Care: The American Law lnstitute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 705, 713 (1984) ("The duty of care, however, helps ensure that directors are at-
tentive to prevent the kind of risk that does not benefit the corporation."). 
19. See Conard, supra note 18, at 904-05. 
20. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
21. Commentators often cite Professor Bishop's seminal article on the indemnifica-
tion of corporate directors, in which he noted that "[t]he search for cases in which direc-
tors of industrial corporations have been lield liable in derivative suits for negligence 
uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very 
large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifi-
cation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968); see also 
Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and 
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REv. 591, 591 (1983) 
("Cases that assess damages against negligent management are rare to the point of be-
coming an endangered species."). 
Most commentators agree that mismatched liability for duty of care violations has led 
to judicial nullification of the duty of care principle in ·many circumstances. See Conard, 
Theses For a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 259, 267 (1986): 
Trial judges, whom higher courts recurrently find to have made erroneous rul-
ings, are understandably reluctant to impose million-dollar liabilities on their 
counterparts in commerce whose decisions appear to have been in error. Courts 
find many ways, the foremost of which is the business judgment rule, to negate 
the application of the liability principle. 
However, since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Francis v. United Jersey Bank 
in 1981, courts have been willing to impose director liability for duty of care violations in 
cases involving financial institutions. See Fitzpatrick v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 765 
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1051 (1983); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). 
22. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985). Briefly stated, a class suit 
was filed against Van Gorkom, who was the Chief Executive Officer, and the Trans 
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In response to the Trans Union decision and the problems 
created by the insurance crisis, the Delaware legislature modi-
fied its duty of care provisions. Effective July 1, 1986, section 
102(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which enu-
merates the provisions a Delaware corporation may include in its 
certificate of incorporation, was amended by the addition of sub-
section (7).23 The new section 102(b)(7) is an enabling act that 
permits corporations, through stockholder-approved charter 
amendments, to eliminate or limit their directors' monetary lia-
bility for violations of their duty of care.24 The possible elimina-
Union board alleging a breach of duty by the directors in approving a merger offer from 
the Pritzker group. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the directors were not enti-
tled to the protection of the business judgment rule because their decision was not an 
informed one. The directors failed to conduct a valuation study or make other efforts to 
determine whether the price offered was fair. Subsequent attempts to solicit other com-
peting offers were found to be ineffectual because of the constraints imposed by the 
Pritzker pre-merger agreement. The shareholders' ratification of the proposal did not 
excuse the directors because the shareholders had been misled into believing that the 
directors had carefully negotiated a fair price. 
For an analysis supporting the Delaware Supreme Court's application of the duty of 
care in. the Trans Union decision, see Burgman & Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate 
Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CoRP. L. 
311 (1986). For a criticism of the decision, see Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and 
the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985). 
Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions have also found directors liable for duty of care 
violations when they failed to deliberate sufficiently before approving a takeover offer. 
See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986): 
It is not enough that directors merely be disinterested and thus not disposed to 
self-dealing or other indicia of a breach of the duty of loyalty. Directors are also 
held to a standard of due care. They must meet this standard with "conscien-
tious fairness." For example, where their "methodologies and procedures" are 
"so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or 
halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham," then inquiry into their acts is 
not shielded by the business judgment rule. 
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). 
See also Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing the 
above excerpt from Hanson in support of a similar decision to forbid business judgment 
rule protection of a rubber stamp decision of outside directors). 
23. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) reads as follows: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the cor-
poration or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liabil-
ity of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corpo-
ration or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under section 
174 of this Title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability 
of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provi-
sion becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be 
deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not 
authorized to issue capital stock. 
24. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the duty of care standard in Delaware. 
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tion of monetary damages does not excuse directors of their duty 
of care. Directors will still be charged with the duty of care in 
their decisionmaking process, and courts will be able to provide 
equitable remedies in relevant cases such as mergers or acquisi-
tions in which the plaintiffs are suing for injunctive relief. This 
enabling act does not permit exemptions from liability in cases 
of bad faith, breach of loyalty, or any other form of self-
dealing. 211 
Because of Delaware's preeminence in the field of corporate 
law, many states are likely to follow with similar legislation that 
will permit corporations to limit duty of care liability.26 This 
Note explores the corporate law principles guiding the amend-
ment of section 102(b)(7) and considers what effects this statute 
will have on the investor-director relationship. The Note focuses 
on whether this reform measure excessively protects directors at 
the expense of shareholders. 
Part I analyzes the neoclassical economic view of the contrac-
tual relationship between stockholders and management that 
serves as the theoretical justification of section 102(b)(7). Part II 
proposes a modification of the Delaware statute that would pro-
25. Exemption from personal liability can only apply to the actions of directors qua 
directors. The.statute does not shield from monetary liability inside directors who make 
decisions in their capacities as officers. 
26. Before the enactment of the new Delaware legislation, both Indiana and Virginia 
had already adopted novel approaches to the insurance crisis. The Indiana legislature 
completely emasculated directors' duty of care liability. Effective April 1, 1986, Indiana 
amended § 23-1-35-1 of the Indiana Code to eliminate any duty of care liability unless 
the breach or failure to perform constituted willful misconduct or recklessness. IND. CODE 
ANN. § 23-1-35-l(e) (West Supp. 1986). Virginia redefined directors' duty of care nar-
rowly in terms of a subjective good faith business judgment, thereby eliminating an ob-
jective standard. VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985). 
Michigan has recently enacted legislation similar to Delaware's. Effective March 1, 
1987, § 450.1209 of the Michigan Compiled Laws allows corporations to include in their 
articles of incorporation a provision eliminating or limiting directors' monetary liability 
for duty of care violations. Act No. 1, § 209, Enrolled Senate Bill No. 18 (Feb. 27, 1987) 
(to be codified at MICH COMP. LAWS § 450.1209). 
Other states will no doubt feel compelled to reduce directors' liability in order to com-
pete successfully with Delaware for corporate charters. Corporate law scholars have de-
bated the wisdom of this state competition. Advocates of federal regulation of corpora-
tions argue that state competition produces a regulatory system that caters to 
management interests at the expense of shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism 
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). The neoclassi-
cal school disagrees with this theory, arguing that state competition leads to the develop-
ment of optimal laws. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). For 
a recent empirical study of why firms choose to incorporate or reincorporate in Delaware, 
see Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 
0RG. 225 (1985). 
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vide for periodic shareholder review of charter amendments lim-
iting liability. 
I. CHARTER AMENDMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS THEORY 
The Delaware legislature's addition of section 102(b)(7) is not 
merely an attempt to reverse an unpopular court decision. The 
amendment appears to represent a shift in the traditional theo-
retical underpinnings of the investor-management relationship. 
Instead of relying on duty of care liability rule~ to monitor man-
agement actions, this new approach relies on market constraints 
and private contracting to protect shareholder interests. This 
Part analyzes the desirability of leaving shareholders and direc-
tors responsible for contractually determining liability through 
charter amendments. 
A. Investor-Management Relations: The Neoclassical Theory 
of the Firm 
Over the past decade, the escalation of derivative suits and 
indemnification costs has divided scholars over the utility of lia-
bility rules that enforce the duty of care.27 All recognize that 
without any constraints directors may tend to "fall asleep at the 
wheel" and simply serve as rubber stamps for management deci-
27. Numerous articles have presented both sides of the issue. For an example of the 
neoclassical economics argument criticizing the use of liability rules, see Fischel & Brad-
ley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986). Fischel and Bradley cite 
empirical evidence in support of their claim that liability rules do not play a fundamen-
tal role in aligning the interests of investors and managers. 
In defense of the duty of care, see Frankel, supra note 18. Frankel responds to critics 
of the duty of care who claim that it is too costly and ineffective. 
The American Law lnstitute's (ALI) attempt to draft its Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance has sharpened the scholarly debate over the utility of duty of care liability. The 
current draft supports the imposition of duty of care liability under a monitoring model. 
See Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 3, § 4.01. With respect to the controversy over 
limiting duty of care liability, the ALI is currently considering its own innovative propo-
sal that would allow corporations to limit duty of care liability to the amount of benefits 
that a director or an officer receives. The ALI has not yet officially agreed to a position 
on this issue. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 7.17 (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Tentative Draft 
No. 6). For a discussion of the ALI position, see Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Gov-
ernance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
789 (1985). See also infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of 
the debate. 
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sions. Disagreement arises over the necessity for liability rules to 
constrain management negligence. 
Two schools of thought have developed. Proponents of the 
neoclassical market model argue that duty of care liability is 
costly and unnecessary because market mechanisms adequately 
constrain directors' behavior.28 These market constraints arise 
from the efficient workings of three markets: the securities mar-
ket, the executive employment market, and the products mar-
ket. 29 Greatly simplified, the argument turns on the premise that 
a poorly run firm will be subject to hostile takeovers and other 
market responses that threaten the job security and prestige of 
management and otherwise reduce the value of management's 
services.30 The stock price will reflect any harm to the corpora-
tion caused by management's negligence. If the likely decrease 
in personal wealth and prestige of management resulting from 
the lower price is not alone an effective deterrent against negli-
gence, directors must also recognize that the stock market func-
tions as a market for corporate control. If the price drops too 
low, directors may lose their jobs in a hostile takeover. 31 
Critics of the neoclassical model argue that market constraints 
, are not consistent enough to deter and discipline inefficient 
management.32 These critics defend the imposition of duty of 
care liability as a necessary mechanism for protecting share-
28. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 
(1982); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 27; Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: 
A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 653 (1984); Scott, Corporation Law and 
the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 936 
(1983). Professor Scott argues that duty of care liability is of minor importance because 
the capacity of the board members to prevent bad decisions is inherently limited by·their 
ex post facto monitoring role. The director's job is "to distinguish bad decisions from 
bad luck in the aftermath of a bad outcome." Id. 
29. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive 
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 836-42 (1981). 
30. For a more thorough discussion of the functioning of the market for corporate 
control, see id. at 841-45. 
31. Phillips lists four principal reasons why management would want to avoid a de-
crease in the value of the corporation's securities: (1) increased likelihood of hostile take-
overs, (2) decline in wealth of the manager's personal stock holdings in the corporation, 
(3) decreased likelihood of alternative bids for the manager's services, and (4) a decrease 
in market value that would increase capital costs and thereby decrease the corporation's 
ability to compete in the corporation's product markets. Phillips, supra note 28, at 674-
75. 
- 32. For example, when corporations adopt antitakeover measures such as poison pills 
and dual class capitalization plans, they impede the market for corporate control by sub-
stantially raising the transaction costs of acquiring the corporation. See Coffee, Regulat· 
ing the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role 
in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). Coffee argues that the enor-
mous costs involved in mounting hostile bids means that this deterrent force "is likely to 
be limited to instances of gross managerial failure." Id. at 1200. 
In defense of the neoclassical theory, however, the recent growth of junk bond financ-
ing has shown that large corporations are no longer invulnerable to a takeover bid. The 
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holder interests and providing an incentive for derivative litiga-
tion over the duty of care.33 They believe that management in-
fluence over outside directors is so great that without liability 
rules the board would have little incentive to challenge manage-
ment's recommendations. 34 
This Note does not attempt to resolve the dispute over the 
effectiveness of liability rules and market mechanisms in regu-
lating management behavior. Instead, this Part examines the 
second component of the Delaware approach-the use of private 
contracting through charter amendments to determine optimal 
levels of liability. 
The use of charter amendments in the Delaware approach is 
based on the neoclassical economic theory of the firm. The neo-
classical model views the firm as a nexus of contracts-contracts 
between the firm and investors, employees, suppliers, and con-
sumers. 311 In large, publicly held corporations, the separation of 
ultimate effectiveness of the market for corporate control will depend on whether the law 
continues to permit corporations to adopt antitakeover measures. See Gilson, supra note 
29, at 844-45, for a discussion of the dangers of antitakeover measures. See also infra 
note 60. 
33. The driving force behind duty of care derivative litigation is the plaintiff's attor-
ney. Without any director liability, there will certainly be a dramatic reduction in both 
valid a'1d frivolous duty of care claims. For a discussion of the role of plaintiff's attorneys 
in enforcing derivative claims, see Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). Coffee noted that "our system has long 
accepted, if somewhat uneasily, the concept of the plaintiff's attorney as an entrepreneur 
who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable conduct." Id. at 678. 
34. Critics of the neoclassical model argue that reputation and market factors are not 
powerful enough forces to overcome the pressure of collegiality in the boardroom. See, 
e.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 145. The structural bias that grows out of a business 
ethic under which directors are expected to protect management from attack by outsid-
ers makes outside directors reluctant to challenge management actions. 
Some theorists have even posited the general lack of corporate accountability as a 
product of American cultural disfavor for any meddling with business affairs. A recent 
New York Times article discussed the cultural characteristics which accounted for Amer-
ican reluctance to overturn authority: 
In addition, Americans are taught from an early age to value and respect indi-
viduality, to resent meddling with their business affairs, and to loathe any sys-
tem that smacks of a Big Brother type of watchdog. In business, that often 
translates into a distaste for any system of checks and balances on executive 
behavior, even from a chief executive's board. 
Prokesch, America's Imperial Chief Executive, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, § 3, at 1, col. 
1, at 25, col. 3. 
35. For a more sophisticated explanation of the neoclassical theory of the firm, see 
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983); Jen-
son & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). For a critique of the "nexus of contracts" 
theory, see Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
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ownership and control represents an efficient contractual spe-
cialization of function. The rational investor will invest in sev-
eral different enterprises in order to minimize his risk. 36 He 
lacks the management skill and the inclination to watch closely 
over the businesses in which he has invested, so he contracts 
with professional managers to supervise the corporation. Manag-
ers benefit because they can pursue profitable business opportu-
nities even though they lack large personal wealth. 37 
This theory also recognizes certain costs inherent in the inves-
tor-managem~nt contractual relationship. The most important 
of these costs, labeled "agency costs," is the incentive that man-
agers and directors have to shirk their duties.38 Because manag-
ers are not risking their own money, they have les~ incentive to 
concentrate on maximizing firm wealth than if they themselves 
were the principals. 
Two mechanisms can reduce agency costs: market forces and 
private bargaining. Competition in the securities and employ-
ment markets reduces the divergence of interests between man-
agers and investors.39 Neoclassical theory also recognizes that 
shareholders can use their bargaining position in the contractual 
relationship to negotiate disincentives to management self-deal-
ing. For example, stock bonus plans provide an incentive for 
wealth maximization by indexing management compensation to 
the overall wealth of the firm. 
This concept of stockholder-management bargaining justifies 
the charter amendment approach conceptually. By requiring 
stockholder approval of a charter amendment, section 102(b)(7) 
allows stockholders and directors to allocate the optimal amount 
of duty of care liability. In a perfect market situation, with no 
contracting costs, this approach would be ideal. One might easily 
imagine that for many highly competitive industries, stockhold-
tract, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF THE BUSINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser 
ed. 1985). 
36. Under the "portfolio theory," an efficient portfolio requires investments in a large 
number of firms in different industries. A diversified investor will thereby assume the 
risk of the market as a whole, called the systematic risk, but avoid the risk specific to 
each individual firm. For a discussion of how duty of care liability can reduce the level of 
systematic risk, see Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for 
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 748-52 (1984). 
37. Fischel, supra not~ 28, at 1262. 
38. Agency costs include, in addition to the residual loss from the failure to maximize 
wealth, the costs of monitoring management behavior, and the costs of providing share· 
holders with assurances that management will not shirk their duties. See Jenson & 
Meckling, supra note 35, at 308. 
39. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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ers may wish to allow directors to opt out of duty of care liabil-
ity in order to encourage risk-taking and to reduce the heavy 
costs of insurance indemnification. Others may wish to put a cap 
on liability, while still others, who have less trust in manage-
ment, may not wish to alter the status quo. Whatever the posi-
tion of stockholders, the current insurance crisis demonstrates 
that unlimited liability is not optimal for many corporations, es-
pecially those that cannot afford insurance. 
B. A Problem with the Delaware Model: Information Costs 
Although the charter amendment approach may be concep-
tually attractive because it allows parties to allocate optimally_ 
their own risk, the realities of shareholder bargaining power sug-
gest that charter amendments are rarely a product of fair bar-
gaining. Widespread shareholder apathy,"0 combined with man-
agement control of the proxy process,41 suggests that these 
parties may not be able to allocate fairly the risk of director neg-
ligence. Unless institutional investors demonstrate a greater in-
terest in corporate governance, any attempts to eliminate or 
limit liability through charter amendments will usually reflect a 
bias in favor of the management position. 
Critics of the agency-costs theory have noted that in large 
publicly held corporations scattered investors have little or no 
ability to negotiate the terms of management's employment. 42 
Shareholders often are asked merely to ratify a charter amend-
ment which interested directors have proposed. The sharehold-
ers are limited to rejecting or accepting the deal formulated by 
the interested directors. Even if the proposed amendment was 
reasonable, the stockholders should be entitled to have someone 
negotiate the optimal level of director liability with shareholder 
interests in mind. The interested directors cannot fulfill that 
role.43 
40. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
42. For an extensive criticism of the agency-costs theory, see Brudney, supra note 35, 
at 1414-20. Professor Brudney disputes the contention that stockholders have the ability 
to contract with management, or that the market can effectively implement investor con-
straints on management. Stockholders do not have the knowledge or ability to learn 
about or affect the terms of the relationship that they are supposedly contracting. 
43. This dilemma is analogous to the problem which occurs when shareholders are 
asked to ratify corporate transactions with interested directors. Shareholders are entitled 
to have the best deal possible negotiated for them, not to have their choices limited to 
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Not surprisingly, an initial informal survey of charter amend-
ment proposals conducted in the first few months after adoption 
of section 102(b)(7) found that virtually all were for the com-
plete elimination of liability."" Given the high costs of D & 0 in-
surance and management's self-interest in reducing their expo-
sure to liability, management has little reason not to propose a 
complete elimination of liability unless it anticipates difficulty 
selling the idea to shareholders. In smaller companies and finan-
cially troubled companies, management may have trouble con-
vincing shareholders to eliminate liability, but the vast majority 
of Delaware corporations are not likely to encounter substantial 
resistance to charter amendment proposals to eliminate 
liability. •11 
One factor that decreases shareholder negotiating power stems 
from the structural advantage management retains in the proxy 
system. For an independent shareholder, the opportunity costs 
· of reviewing a proxy statement and subsequently casting a vote 
outweigh the benefits of an informed vote.46 This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as the rational apathy problem.47 Unless 
the individual shareholder possesses a large block of stock, his 
personal vote will have little or no impact. 48 Even if the costs of 
review are minimal, a rational shareholder may seek a free ride 
and abstain from voting if he believes that enough of the other 
shareholders will respond.49 Because of individual shareholders' 
rejecting or accepting a deal formulated by interested parties. See Marsh, Are Directors 
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 48-49 (1966). 
44. See Early Foul-Ups in the Stampede to Delaware's New Liability-Limiting 
Statute, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Aug. 1986, at 7 (news update published by The Ameri-
can Lawyer). None of the lawyers consulted were aware of any company that has chosen 
to cap liability instead of eliminating it completely. 
45. Charter amendments proposed by financially troubled corporations probably face 
a far greater chance of defeat for the simple reason that stockholders will be more alert 
to directors' attempts to avoid liability. Shareholders usually take a greater interest in 
board decisions when a corporation's viability is at stake. 
Closely held corporations and smaller corporations will fit the negotiating model of the 
agency-cost theory better than large corporations because the rational apathy problem 
will decrease as the number of shareholders decreases. Shareholders in a closely held 
corporation are likely to be directly involved in management or the supervision of man-
agement, and the percentage of their ownership will be substantial. 
46. For a general discussion of this problem and stockholder voting, see R. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986). 
47. Id. 
48. Institutional investors almost always own sufficient stock to warrant their in-
formed voting on corporate governance questions. See infra notes 50-56 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of institutional investor voting. 
49. Because an active shareholder cannot retain all the benefits of his supervisory 
efforts unless he owns 100% of the stock, an externality is created. Other .shareholders 
will recognize this and try to reap the benefits of this externality without incurring the 
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preference for the free ride, shareholders' interests in large pub-
licly held corporations will not be represented unless a share-
holder amongst them has vast interests that outweigh the costs 
of informed voting. Large institutional investors can often fulfill 
this role. 
C. Institutional Investors: A Correcting Mechanism? 
This section considers whether institutional investors can sup-
ply the bargaining power which the charter amendment ap-
proach requires but individual shareholders lack. Institutional 
investors have the resources and motivation to cast informed 
votes on charter amendment proposals. 60 If institutional inves-
tors represented the interests of all stockholders, then charter 
amendments would reflect effective bargaining over risk alloca-
tion. The evidence, however, suggests that most institutional in-
vestors, with the possible exception of public pension funds, are 
reluctant to involve themselves in such corporate governance 
questions, and, when they do vote, they rarely oppose manage-
ment.1H If this behavior continues, shareholder interests will not 
be adequately represented in most proceedings to adopt charter 
amendments that restrict or eliminate director liability. 
Historically, institutional investors have been reluctant to in-
volve themselves in corporate decisionmaking.112 If corporate pol-
icies appear inappropriate, institutional investors have preferred 
costs of informed voting. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and 
Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 778-80 (1978), for a thorough discussion of 
the free rider problem. 
50. The term institutional investors includes banks, insurance companies, mutual 
funds, public and private pension funds, and nonprofit institutions such as university 
endowments. Institutional investors are the largest holders of stock in most of the na-
tion's leading corporations. A 1978 Senate study on institutional investor holdings found 
that large institutional investors often hold "over five percent of the outstanding shares 
of a major corporate enterprise and many multiples of that held by the largest individual 
investors." J. ALLEN, THE EXERCISE OF VOTING RIGHTS BY LARGE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
(1977), reprinted in STAFF OF SuBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT OF THE 
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., VOTING RIGHTS IN MA-
JOR CORPORATIONS 559, 569 (Comm. Print 1978). 
For a recent example of the vast holdings of public pension funds, see Dunphy, Wall 
Street's Waking Giants, Det. Free Press, Feb. 1, 1987, at lG, col. 2. The article lists the 
State of Michigan Pension Fund's top 10 stock holdings, including the number of shares, 
percentage of the fi~m owned, and rank among shareholders. For example, the Michigan 
Pension Fund is the top shareholder of Chase Manhattan Corporation with 3.8 million 
shares, constituting a 4.7% ownership of Chase. The Pension Fund has $14.2 billion in 
assets. 
51. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
52, M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 57: 
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to liquidate their holdings, if possible, rather than remaining 
and seeking a change in management policy or personnel.113 The 
failure of institutional investors to exercise their power to influ-
ence management has often led to the entrenchment of manage-
ment by default. 11• Even when institutional investors vote, they 
rarely oppose management. Professor Melvin Eisenberg has ad-
vanced several reasons fo:r this pro-management position: per-
sonal feelings of obligation to follow the mores of the financial 
community; a desire to stay on good terms with management in 
order to obtain inside information; and, in the case of certain 
institutions such as banks, a desire to retain or cultivate busi-
ness in a noninvestor capacity.1111 
Institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, have 
started to challenge management more often. In 1985, the Coun-
cil of Institutional Investors was established to give pension 
funds a greater voice in corporate governance matters and serve 
as a catalyst for more active institutional investment.116 The 
long-run effectiveness of the Council remains to be seen, but an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that some public pension funds are 
starting to crusade against management policies that threaten 
shareholder interests.117 
Despite the increased participation of pension funds, other in-
stitutional investors are not likely to alter significantly their past 
voting behavior. Investment companies and banks are particu-
Generally speaking, the institutional investors have taken the position that their 
primary obligation lies to their own beneficiaries, not to their fellow shareholders 
in portfolio companies; that they have neither the time nor the skills to exercise 
an oversight function; and that a company whose management should be 
changed is normally an unsound investment, so that an investor who does not 
like incumbent management should switch out of the investment as quickly as 
possible, rather than stay in and try to accomplish a change. 
53. Id. 
54. See D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS 160 (1965). Baum and Stiles 
argue that institutional investors have a duty to their fellow shareholders to oversee 
management. With the power of their holdings comes the responsibility of informed 
voting. 
55. M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 57. Institutional investors can use their power to 
maintain close contacts with management. These contacts are useful for confirming ru-
mors or simply keeping informed of company developments. The information they ob-
tain rarely constitutes material nonpublic information under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934; nevertheless, it is of value to investors. 
56. Hearings Focus on Pension Plan Role in Voting Corporate Governance Proxies, 
17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 130, 131 (Jan. 18, 1985). 
57. See Dunphy, supra note 50. Dunphy discusses the reaction of the Council of In-
stitutional Investors to the General Motors decision to buy out H. Ross Perot. The 
Council insisted that General Motors Chairman Roger Smith attend a meeting in New 
York to defend the company's actions. Members of the Council control more than seven 
million shares of General Motors stock. 
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larly vulnerable to corporate pressures to approve antitakeover 
charter amendments or similar measures. They risk the loss of 
the business of that corporation in future transactions if they 
adopt a confrontational attitude.58 Pension funds are able to 
avoid these pressures because they do not have to maintain sep-
arate business relations with management outside of their par-
ticular investment in the company. 
The risk of legal liability that may result from any group ef-
forts to monitor management also deters institutional investors 
from supervisory activism. If institutional investors combined 
their forces to elect directors, they could be found to be "con-
trolling shareholders" and prima facie liable for any violations of 
securities laws committed by the companies they control. 59 They 
may also be considered insiders and forced to surrender any 
short swing profits as defined under section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.6° Finally, if a group of investors com-
bined to elect directors in competing companies, they may be 
liable for violating the Clayton Act antitrust laws.61 Resolution 
of these problems is a prerequisite for institutional investors to 
participate in the supervision of their portfolio companies. 62 
58. E. FLAX, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUES-
TIONS, 1985 PROXY SEASON (Investor Responsibility Research Center Corporate Govern-
ance Service, Oct. 1985) [hereinafter IRRC STUDY). The study cited testimony from La-
bor Department hearings held in January 1985 on the role of pension funds in the 
corporate governance process. At those hearings, Roger Murray, a long-time director of 
mutual funds, noted: 
The investment manager retains his clients and earns his fees by delivering 
good performance, which is measured against market indexes at frequent inter-
vals. No plan sponsor adds to the performance measures points for thoughtful 
consideration of corporate governance issues. On the other hand, voting portfolio 
shares against the antitakeover proposals of a present or prospective client is 
seldom perceived as the best way to cement or create a warm relationship. 
Id. at 19. 
59. Professor Conard has written on the problem of potential liability of institutional 
investors for supervisory activism. Conard, supra note 21, at 281-83. The liability of con-
trolling shareholders is enumerated in the Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 
(1982); and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985). 
60. Conard, supra note 21, at 282; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). 
61. Conard, supra note 21, at 282. The Clayton Act forbids the same person from 
holding directorships in competing companies. Institutional investors could be found lia-
ble if directors elected with their support were found to be de facto deputies of the 
institutional investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982). 
62. See Conard, supra note 21, at 293-94, for his suggestions for reform. He recom-
mends amending the language of the relevant provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Clayton Act to exclude their application to 
institutional investor supervision of management. 
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A recent Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
study of institutional investor voting on antitakeover charter 
amendments indicates that the level of opposition to antitake-
over proposals has increased, although it has amounted to a re-
jection of only four percent of all antitakeover proposals. 63 The 
remarkably high approval rate for antitakeover measures indi-
cates the likely success rate of proposals to eliminate duty of 
care liability. Antitakeover proposals arguably endanger stock-
holder interests by entrenching management and thereby im-
peding the ability of the market to deter poor management with 
the threat of hostile takeovers. 64 In addition to losing this mar-
ket mechanism for monitoring director performance, stockhold-
ers forego the potential opportunity to sell their shares at a pre-
mium in the event of a hostile bid. Proposals to eliminate duty 
of care liability may pose a similar threat to stockholder inter-
ests by reducing existing constraints on directors' shirking of 
their responsibilities and eliminating a source of compensation 
in the event of a successful duty of care derivative suit.65 
The high success rate of antitakeover proposals also reflects 
careful research by management before submitting any charter 
amendment proposals. The IRRC study indicates that many cor-
porations are using proxy solicitation firms and public relations 
firms to survey shareholder voting behavior and evaluate the 
63. IRRC STUDY, supra note 58, at 15. Of the more than 450 antitakeover charter 
amendment proposals which the IRRC obtained voting results for, only 19 proposals 
were defeated. Id. at 1. The study noted: 
Even though most proposals won approval in 1985, the level of opposition was 
noteworthy in many instances. In fact, a comparison of voting results for 1985 
and 1984 shows that the level of opposition was actually higher in 1985 for some 
types of proposals. These levels of opposition are a fairly sure sign of continuing 
institutional opposition to antitakeover proposals. While some institutions may 
have succumbed to pressures to soften their opposition to shark repellents, many 
others have maintained or even heightened their opposition. 
Id. at 15. 
64. The market for corporate control cannot effectively deter inefficient management 
if target corporations are able to enact antitakeover plans that raise the transaction costs 
of acquiring a corporation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, 
supra note 29, at 844-45. Easterbrook and Fischel argue for a rule of managerial passiv-
ity under which management of the target company would not be allowed to resist a bid. 
But cf. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980). Lipton argues that the threat of 
takeovers may impair management performance by overemphasizing short run stock 
prices at the expense of longer term investment. 
65. This threat to shareholder interests must be balanced against the benefits to the 
corporation resulting from lower insurance payments, less litigation, and the freeing of 
the directors to engage in efficient transactions that they do not now enter into because 
of fear of lawsuits. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. 
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chances of success before putting proposals on the ballot. 66 Some 
corporations have chosen not to introduce antitakeover charter 
amendment proposals when they perceived a substantial risk of 
defeat.67 This suggests that the possibility of defeat may· deter 
some corporations from proposing charter amendments to limit 
liability. 
The results of the IRRC study suggest that the power of 
shareholders to negotiate director liability is grossly inadequate. 
Even with record levels of institutional investor opposition to 
management on corporate governance questions, shareholders 
defeated only four percent of all antitakeover charter amend-
ments.68 Unless institutional investor opposition increases, man-
agement proposals to eliminate the duty of care liability should 
pass without difficulty in financially sound corporations. The 
elimination of directors' liability may be appropriate for some 
companies; however, the constraints on shareholders inherent in 
the principal-agent relationship belie the claim that each com-
pany will reach the optimal level of liability through manage-
ment-investor bargaining. 
II. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 102(b)(7) 
This Part proposes a modification to the Delaware approach 
to mitigate the weak bargaining power of shareholders. The pro-
posed statutory reform would require sunset provisions on char-
ter amendments that limit directors' duty of care liability and 
mandate periodic renewal of such charter amendments by share-
holder vote. This suggestion appeared originally in a tentative 
draft of section 7.l 7(c)(l) of the American Law Institute's Cor-
porate Governance Project.69 At the time of this writing, the ALI 
has not reached an official position on this issue. 
A. Sunset Provisions on Charter Amendments 
In order to compensate for shareholders' lack of bargaining 
power, an enabling statute such as section 102(b)(7) should in-
clude a sunset provision that would cause liability-limiting char-
66. IRRC STuov. supra note 58, at 1. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Tentative Draft No. 6, supra note 27, § 7.17(c)(l); see reporter's comments, id. at 
238-39. 
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ter amendments to expire after a period of time.70 The legisla-
ture would fix the appropriate length of time, but a suggested 
measuring stick would be the normal duration of a board mem-
ber's single term. In those corporations where directors do not 
serve staggered terms, shareholders could contract over the ap-
propriate level of liability prior to each board election. If a direc-
tor did not approve of those terms, he could choose not to run 
for reelection rather than resign in midterm. This scheme would 
fit neatly into the contracting theory,71 because shareholders 
would, in effect, be negotiating the appropriate level of liability 
while negotiating who will serve as a director. Even in corpora-
tions where directors are elected intermittently, this method 
would provide a yardstick of how often shareholders and direc-
tors have deemed it necessary to renegotiate their contractual 
relationship by reelecting or voting out directors. 
Requiring periodic renewal by shareholders would, at a mini-
mum, strengthen the conceptual basis of section 102(b)(7) by re-
ducing the adhesive nature of charter amendments. Without a 
sunset provision, investors who purchase shares after the origi-
nal passage of the charter amendment are forced to accept duty 
of care liability terms that may not be to their liking. The future 
shareholder could, of course, invest elsewhere, but, if duty of 
care limitations are adopted on a widespread basis, that may not 
be a viable option. A bargaining approach to duty of care liabil-
ity, as adopted in section 102(b)(7), must therefore provide fu-
ture shareholders with a method of altering duty of care liability 
agreements which they had no influence over. Mandatory sunset 
provisions would provide shareholders with an inexpensive and 
simple mechanism for reestablishing duty of care liability. If 
shareholders were forced to introduce their own proxy proposals 
to revoke previously ratified charter amendments, the enormous 
costs involved would deter all but the rare shareholder.72 
Those states that wish to follow the charter amendment ap-
proach but do not want to remove all potential sanctions on di-
rectors might couple the sunset provision proposal with non-
70. Apparently, sunset provisions have not been used before for charter amendments, 
so predicting what period of time would be appropriate is difficult. The ALI proposal 
suggests specifying the relevant period so that it "extend[s] to a date reasonably after 
the annual proxy vote, thus giving incumbent directors an opportunity to resign in the 
unlikely event that shareholders failed to renew the provision." Id. at 239. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39. 
72. For a discussion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a-8 requirements for 
shareholder proxy proposals, see Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: 
Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 670, 672-77 (1980). 
562 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
monetary sanctions. For example, states could prohibit a 
director found liable for breaching their duty of care from serv-
ing as an officer, director, or consultant in any corporation for a 
period of time.78 Although not as effective a deterrent as unlim-
ited liability, these career sanctions could be an effective re-
minder to directors of the importance of the duty of care. 
B. Problems with Sunset Provisions 
Whether or not sunset prov1s10ns can actually alleviate the 
weak bargaining position of shareholders depends on certain as-
sumptions regarding shareholder voting. This section discusses 
problems that may prevent sunset provisions from providing any 
meaningful protection of shareholder interests. 
If shareholder apathy prevents effective voting on original 
charter amendment proposals,'" why expect greater •interest in 
future ratifications? Reducing the costs of shareholder voting 
enough to eliminate this problem is not feasible, but repeated 
voting may increase shareholder awareness. Disclosure in a pub-
lic corporation's annual proxy statement711 of the pros and cons 
of the charter amendment would educate many otherwise unin-
formed shareholders. A special requirement of repeated share-
holder approval might also provide significant symbolic value 
because it would reinforce the importance of the fiduciary rela-
tionship between shareholders and directors. 
This suggestion does not pretend that shareholders would 
eventually mobilize to engage in optimal arms-length bargaining 
with management. 76 Shareholders are unlikely to fail to renew 
73. Professor Stone made this proposal in 1975. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 
Soc1AL CONTROL or CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 148-49 (1975). Stone would prohibit the direc-
tor from serving as an officer, director, or consultant of any corporation doing business in 
interstate commerce for three years. He argues: 
The advantages of the "suspension" provision, by contrast, are that it is not so 
easy to get around (notice the "or consultant" proviso); it is not so severe that, 
like potential multi-million-dollar personal liability, it would strike courts as un-
thinkable to impose; but at the same time it would still have some effective 
"bite" to it-the suspendees would be removed from the most prestigious and 
cushy positions ordinarily available to men of their rank, and would, I suspect, 
be objects of some shame among their peers. 
Id. at 149. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
75. The tentative ALI proposal recommends annual disclosure in a public corpora-
tion's proxy statement. Tentative Draft No. 6, supra note 27, at 238. 
76. Indeed, portfolio theory assumes that shareholders are not interested in engaging 
in supervision of their individual portfolio investments. They diversify their holdings in 
order to minimize firm-specific risk. See supra note 36. Unlike individual shareholders, 
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the provision after its original approval if management is per-
ceived to be doing a good job. Management also has the power 
to lobby for favorable votes if they fear a possible def eat. 77 They 
could engage in strategic behavior by tying in sunset provisions 
with other proposals that might act as "sweeteners. "78 If a cor-
poration subsequently became financially troubled, however, 
shareholders would be much more suspicious of a management 
proposal to eliminate liability and they would probably be far 
more active in representing their interests, whether that meant 
reinstating full liability or not. 
The unknown variable that will determine the ultimate effec-
tiveness of charter amendments is the institutional investor. If 
institutional investors disapprove of duty of care limitations and 
find that they cannot avoid these terms by investing in other 
comparable firms, then they will likely increase their interest in 
corporate governance issues such as duty of care limitations. 79 
This involvement would provide the type of shareholder bar-
gaining power that the Delaware approach envisions. 
Section 102(b)(7) modified as recommended above is not a 
perfect solution. It is an attempt to form a compromise between 
legitimate concerns over mismatched director liability and the 
need to protect the rights of shareholders from management ero-
sion. The existing system of insurance indemnification fails to 
serve anyone's interests effectively. The deep pocket offered by 
insurance indemnification promotes frivolous litigation and 
leads to the eventual payment of judgments out of the corpora-
tion's own funds. 80 Any attempt to reduce duty of care liability 
however, institutional investors are often constrained from selling all their shares at the 
first sign of bad management because their holdings are too large to be dumped without 
depressing the market. 
77. Professor Seligman has criticized the proposed use of sunset provisions for dual 
class capitalization plans on the grounds that management influence over the proxy sys-
tem would prevent any effective opposition to ratification. Seligman, Equal Protection in 
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 687, 723-24 (1986). 
78. Id. 
79. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, discussing the increased vocal op-
position of pension funds to management actions of which they disapprove. 
· 80. Professor Conard has accurately described the indemnification mess: 
In order to counter their directors' imminent risk of incurring large defense 
costs and their remote risk of eventual liability, corporations have developed the 
twin practices of indemnifying directors by payments from corporate treasuries 
and buying directors' insurance by payments that come directly from corporate 
treasuries or indirectly by way of increased directors' fees. 
Although insurance is rarely sufficient to cover directors' potential liability, it 
is usually adequate to pay for a settlement of claims, including fees for plaintiffs' 
counsel. Plaintiffs and their lawyers are usually glad to settle because they would 
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is bound to erode incentives for the enforcement of shareholders' 
derivative rights. 81 One must balance this loss, however, against 
the gain to shareholders resulting from more effective manage-
ment decisionmaking, the recruitment of qualified outside direc-
tors, and the ultimate decrease in litigation and insurance costs. 
At least if directors prove to be less diligent in their decision-
making, this proposal will provide shareholders with a mecha-
nism for reinstating unlimited liability or imposing a limited cap 
on liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Delaware's adoption of section 102(b)(7) represents a redefini-
tion of the investor-management relationship. The new statute 
rejects the traditional use of mandatory liability rules for the en-
forcement of a director's fiduciary duty of care and, instead, re-
lies on private bargaining and market constraints. Shareholders 
and directors may now use charter amendments to allocate the 
risk of director negligence as they see fit. 
The problem with this new approach is that shareholders are 
in a weak position to bargain over duty of care liability. Al-
though the elimination of liability may be optimal in some cir-
cumstances, it is conceptually inaccurate to claim that share-
holder consent will result in an optimal arrangement. 
Other states will no doubt consider enabling legislation similar 
to Delaware's section 102(b)(7). States which choose to follow 
this charter amendment approach should include in their ena-
bling statute an automatic sunset provision which would require 
periodic shareholder approval of any limitation on directors' lia-
bility. This provision would serve as a more sound conceptual 
foundation for the bargaining approach to investor-director rela-
tions. It may also help alleviate the weak bargaining position of 
shareholders by increasing their awareness of these charter 
have to invest more and more money in the suit as it dragged on and they might 
lose it altogether if they pursued it to final judgment. Similar considerations 
incline the directors toward settlement. Although the law imposes restrictions on 
indemnification and insurance coverage when directors are found guilty or found 
liable, a settlement before judgment preempts any such finding. The concatena-
tion of liability, indemnification, insurance, settlements, and awards of attor-
neys' fees accomplishes very little that is beneficial, and a great deal that is 
detrimental. 
Conard, supra note 21, at 267-68 (footnotes omitted). 
81. See supra note 33 (discussing the importance of the plaintiff's attorney in initiat-
ing derivative suits). 
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amendment provisions and providing them with an opportunity 
to reinstate liability if they are unhappy with management 
performance. 
-Craig W. Hammond 

